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             Executive Summary 
This consultation response begins by briefly setting out some context to “green economy, which has been re-
labelled and re-packaged several times, partly to make the idea more attractive and agreeable to a wider audience. 
The European Union’s (EU’s) articulation of a ‘Green Deal’ offers a useful reference (page 3).  
(Q1) On prioritising sectors for the Green Recovery (GR), we acknowledge the importance of the power sector and 
the particularly the decarbonisation of heat for buildings. However, there should also be focus on transport and 
the construction industry which, up until now have made very little net reduction. Correctly remunerating the 
displacement of fossil fuel at the margin and taking into account the concomitant distributional effects of low-
carbon technological adoption and policy changes is central to a just transition to a low-carbon economy. We 
provide learning from studies in the UK and abroad to discuss the efficacy of regional developments, zero interest 
loans and decentralised renewable/storage technologies and EVs for consumers in different socio-economic 
circumstances. Schemes should be evaluated, ideally with gold standard randomised controlled tests.  
(Q2) On supporting people who have lost employment during this crisis to move into environmental growth 
sectors, we outline the importance of regional task forces that comprise of all types of actors in the labour market. 
We provide some evidence for positive GR job growth, but government and businesses will need to ease frictions 
that arise from workers moving from sunset to green industries with training provision. Longer-term, politicians 
should be cognisant of the unpredictable ramifications that (deflationary) rapid technological change such as solar 
might have on incentives, job growth and the Labour Party’s priorities.  
(Q3) On whether sector-specific support for business should be given during the Covid-19 crisis, we suggest 
regional development funds and regional tasks forces could be created, starting with the energy, transport and 
construction sectors. A more proactive process of skills/education and the potential barriers/frictions could help 
ensure a smooth transition within and between sectors for workers.  
(Q5) On dealing with the regional and area-based impacts of this crisis, upskilling and retraining workers to enable 
them to move from older declining sunset industries or sub-sectors/businesses adversely affected by the Covid-19 
crisis to new green jobs.  
(Q6) On helping existing businesses, including SMEs, to adapt as a result of the crisis, we emphasise investment in 
infrastructure, physical capital, new technologies, and the provision of funding for (re)training of employees in 
businesses of all sizes.  
(Q7) On how the proposed measures we put forward can improve quality of life, we highlight the benefits of 
employment, job security and continued training/upskilling of workers. Where there is progress or future schemes 
being rolled out, we point to the success of opt-out mechanisms in changing behaviour in complex markets (e.g. 
organ donations and pension contributions) and make the case to apply this to installed solar PV, tree planting in 
public/Government owned land. On transport, we discuss ways to move up the S-curve for adoption.  
 (Q9) On the key institutions who should play a role in delivering a green recovery, we advance inclusionary, 
participative, deliberative decision-making processes. On effective delivery, we emphasise (with examples) the 
importance of getting right regulatory structure to incentivise sharing of resources and technologies for better 
environmental management of common-pool resources is crucial. 
(Q10) On other important points and issues, we see Covid-19 as an opportunity to break old habits (path 
dependency) and instil new (greener) ones, rather than continue ‘business as usual’. We list some concrete 
examples on household consumption, education and transport. In the context of Brexit trade negotiations and the 
debates around level playing field, we cite how well targeted regulation can provide a boost to productivity, rather 




CCP Response to the Labour Party: Green Recovery Consultation  
We very much welcome this opportunity to respond to the Labour Party’s consultation on a 
“Green Recovery”. Within the remit of our expertise, we respond to each question bar 
question 4 and question 8. CCP houses a diverse set of members and this response reflects 
the views of the authors not the Centre as a whole. We focus on the examples of energy, 
transportation and construction in many of our answers but before doing so we provide some 
brief comments on the context for the debate about greening an economy and realising a 
green recovery. 
 
Background: Greening an economy and a Green Recovery 
The notions of a ‘green economy’ and the process of ‘greening’ an economy, and by extension 
that of a ‘green recovery’, have a long history (see Fairbrass and Vasilakos, chapter 1, 
forthcoming and Benson et al., chapter 2, forthcoming). These terms, or their synonyms, first 
surfaced a couple of centuries ago, although the issue has only really risen to the top of the 
public policy-making agenda in the past two decades, as individuals and organisations in the 
public, private and third sectors have wrestled with definitions, interpretations, and how best 
to implement the ideas in practice. Indeed, the lack of terminological and definitional clarity 
appears to have hampered implementation. So long as alternative labels and phrases such as 
‘sustainability’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘low carbon economy’ and the ‘circular economy’ 
exist in parallel, vie for acceptance, and pass into and out of fashion, this only serves to 
compound the miasma surrounding this topic. The result is that, currently, there are a number 
of expressions in use that include the word ‘green’ as an adjective in conjunction with other 
terms such as ‘jobs’, ‘collar’ and ‘economy’ that serve as substitutes for one another.   
Figure 1: The European Green Deal 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 2019, p3 
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What is clear is that over the course of time, the idea of a green economy has been re-labelled 
and re-packaged several times, partly in an effort to make the idea more attractive and 
agreeable to a wider audience. Whilst a universal agreement about which labels to employ 
and what they mean remains elusive, the European Union’s (EU’s) articulation of a ‘Green 
Deal’ does offer some useful guidance. See the Figure below. In effect, the EU’s Green Deal 
highlights the essential elements of a green economy and points to ways of amalgamating 
economic targets with more ecologically and socially ethical forms of progress. 
Having furnished a background to the discussion, we now proceed to address the questions 




1. What sectors do you believe are the priorities for investment from government, for a 
green recovery programme to build a stronger, more resilient future economy? How can 
this investment reduce regional inequalities as well as address the climate crisis and 
environmental degradation? And what science and technologies do we need to invest in?  
It is widely acknowledged that the power sector could be a main contributor in bringing about 
emission reductions thus far in the UK, primarily through the phasing out of coal, whilst all 
other sectors have either made small inroads, stagnated, or increased greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 2019). A case therefore could be made for other 
sectors to be prioritised for investment as part of a green recovery, in particular those such 
as transport and the construction industry which, up until now have made very little net 
reductions (BEIS, 2016).  
Nonetheless, in the initial phase of any green recovery, the prioritisation of the 
decarbonisation of heat for buildings is crucial. This requires rapid investment in the 
electrification and the concomitant installation of low-carbon heating (e.g. heat pumps). 
Indeed, an argument could be made for the expansion of existing combined heat and power 
(CHP) (and cooling) district heating (DH) schemes, which can flexibly integrate low-carbon 
sources (a common approach taken by Nordic countries, for example). In order to bolster 
households’ acceptance of, and demand for, DH schemes, improvements in the regulation 
surrounding the protection of consumers within current/future DH schemes are required, 
particularly considering the lock-in effects that arise when entering a contract with a localised 
monopoly and potential weaker routes to redress. 
However, research utilising a representative sample of households in Birmingham suggests 
that low-income and fuel poor households are less likely to adopt low-carbon heating 
(Burlinson et al., 2018), despite representing those most likely to benefit from ‘win-win’ 
solutions i.e. those able to reduce emissions and costs for the end-user. Regional inequalities 
in wealth, energy and health could partly be resolved by targeting low-carbon heating 
investment towards low income, fuel poor and/or vulnerable households (e.g. elderly 
households with long-term illnesses/disabilities and/or off-grid) and by the provision of the 
necessary energy efficiency and structural improvements (e.g. insulation) able to achieve 
optimal thermal comfort.  
Lyubich (2020) puts forward initial evidence that finds a gap in energy expenditure between 
black and white communities in the United States. Hence, research could further help identify 
the extent to which structural inequalities, differences in housing stock, and energy efficiency 
measures can explain expenditure patterns in the UK’s residential sector. 
To make progress towards achieving this aim, the idea of allocating substantial public funding 
to energy efficiency and structural initiatives must be revisited as a matter of urgency. The 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO) is inadequate. Moreover, the defunct Green Deal, whilst 
sensible in theory, was unpopular among households. It became apparent that the majority 
of installations did not deliver on its ‘golden rule’.1 Regional development funds could be 
 
1 The Golden Rule specified two conditions prior to installing energy efficiency measures using Green 
Deal finance: 1) the expected monthly savings must exceed the monthly repayments paid via the 
households’ energy bill, and 2) the duration of payments must fall below the lifetime durability of the 
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initiated with the support of community-based initiatives and trusted organisations. A 
ground-up approach is necessary to identify, target, and reach out to low-income, fuel poor 
and/or vulnerable households.  Such a targeted regional approach is likely to be a fruitful tool 
for facilitating a green recovery.  
In addition, the introduction of zero percent interest loans could provide another source of 
finance for households and, importantly, for landlords (filling the void left by the cessation of 
the Green Deal). Zero percent interest loans could help resolve the so-called landlord-tenant 
(split-incentive) problem (Davis, 2010; Gillingham et al., 2012) and provide a route towards 
meeting future Energy Performance Certificate requirements. They could also start to correct 
the disparity between the quality of accommodation in the private rented sector compared 
to all other tenures (Burlinson, 2017). We believe such finance deals are also advantageous 
due to the familiarity many households within the UK population have with these as a method 
of making larger consumption decisions.  
During this initial phase of a green recovery, the electrification of heating will clearly require 
the continued decarbonisation of the power sector. Investment in large scale offshore wind 
turbines and onshore wind and utility scale solar, which now benefit from being cost 
competitive with conventional forms of generation, will be paramount (Lazard, 2019). Further 
progress could be made if financial incentives correctly remunerate innovative business 
models (e.g. energy storage, smart digital consumers/prosumers) at the margin (Burlinson 
and Guilietti, 2018; Beltrami et al., 2020; Giulietti et al., 2020). However, it is important to 
consider the structural changes (e.g. labour markets) that may arise whilst moving from 
phasing out coal to the displacement of gas fired power plants. 
In the regional dimension, there is potential to further explore how the renewable energy 
sector and its infrastructure can not only provide lean energy supply domestically, but also 
consider how public funding (e.g. regional development funds) could incentivise the 
location/relocation of industry to particular areas of the country with the highest indicators 
of deprivation (e.g. employment, income, health, education). Indeed, such industrial activity 
could bring about ancillary benefits in the form of the export of renewable products and 
services. Consider, for example, the local developments in and around Hull in the UK and 
Bremerhaven in Germany (see Moulton et al., Chapter 6, forthcoming). These two coastal 
cities had both suffered major economic setbacks as a result of severe declines in local 
maritime industries (e.g. fisheries and shipbuilding). However, using differing strategies, both 
cities have turned to renewables, especially offshore wind, and the ‘green’ improvement of 
public housing as a source of jobs, economic growth and recovery. 
Alongside power and heating buildings, transport (including aviation and ground transport) 
should be prioritised.2 Electric vehicles at present represent a small proportion of registered 
vehicles in the UK, i.e. fewer than 5 per cent. Whilst the barriers are well known (e.g. upfront 
costs, range anxiety), services that pull households towards owning electric vehicles (rather 
than pushing households with financial incentives) could be further explored. Lessons can be 
learnt from vehicle charging innovations that underperformed in Denmark and Israel (Noel 
 
measure. The key pitfalls must be addressed, i.e. relatively high interest rates on repayment and 
savings that fell below expectations. 
2 Herein we focus on ground transport. 
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and Sovacool, 2016) as well as innovative charging services developing in China. For example, 
NIO (the so-called Chinese Tesla), offers the ‘worry-free power plan’ which, for a monthly 
subscription, provides a 1000kWh free charging quota, valet charging services, battery 
upgrades and access to battery swapping/charging stations. Such services could be crucial for 
attracting households who may continue to experience range anxiety (in the short-medium 
term) and, for example, do not have access to a private charging point (e.g. rented properties, 
tower blocks) (Burlinson et al., 2020). It is also generally a useful tool for households when 
making financial planning decisions.  
In addition, a central consideration for uptake is likely to be the weight that households place 
on upfront costs relative to annual costs, hence subsidies focusing on the former could have 
greater impact in the short-term. However, it is notoriously difficult to encourage 
engagement of households with energy using durables even when products appear to be 
‘win-win’ from an economic and environmental perspective. A rich literature explores this 
apparent energy efficiency paradox, which states that consumers often do not adopt energy 
efficient technologies, despite being made very aware of the risk-free long-term savings they 
can enjoy here (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). Hence market-
based, non-market and behavioural drivers of this paradox could be considered in terms of 
the barriers preventing a green recovery.  
Further research is needed to help understand and assist households in switching to green 
energy tariffs. Whilst companies like Bulb, Octopus and So Energy, offering low-cost, low-
carbon tariffs, have broken into the retail sector, there is still significant consumer inertia in 
the market. Despite low search and switching costs, households do not necessarily switch for 
savings alone (Deller et al., 2020). In light of this, consumers’ financial and non-financial 
preferences are also key to understanding the potential for a green recovery. 
Going forward it is crucial to consider the impact of a large-scale uptake of decentralised 
renewable/storage technologies and EVs on households who rely on legacy natural gas and 
power infrastructure (e.g. distribution networks). There is emerging evidence that suggests 
that a ‘death spiral’ in legacy infrastructure could arise as households become increasingly 
independent from the grid. The interaction of solar and storage technologies could result in 
the legacy infrastructure costs being shared by a shrinking household base, thereby leading 
to further take up (Bennato et al., 2019). Similar to the disappearance of high street banks 
and post offices as more households go digital, it is important to support low income, fuel-
poor, and vulnerable households who rely on legacy infrastructure, especially those who are 
unable to (or take more time to) adopt low carbon technologies, in order to ensure a just 
transition for all.  
Whilst regional development funds and zero per cent loans could also serve as potential 
mechanisms to help balance the number of high vs. low-medium income solar PV owners (or 
prosumers), there might be room for the installation of solar PV at scale across the socially 
rented sector. A national or regional funded project(s) could be created in which all social 
housing which meet the operational requirements for the optimal use of solar PV (e.g. roof 
space, roof direction) are automatically enrolled for free panels i.e. zero upfront or 
maintenance costs. The behavioural economics literature on framing tells us that an opt-out 
mechanism, rather than opt-in, could alleviate some of the inertia in the market (Johnson et 
al., 2002). This is so long as there are organisations that can support households from the 
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ground-up and, just as importantly, can garner public acceptance (Ambrosio-Albalá et al., 
2019). Local authorities and communities could share the benefits by providing ancillary 
services to the grid through the creation of distributed generation and perhaps create a 
flexible energy system with community storage installed alongside.  
As with technology adoption, the analysis of the distributional effects arising from carbon 
taxes (and subsidies if taxation is infeasible) used to correct environmental externalities, must 
be at the heart of a just transition. The Office for Gas and Electricity Markets is conducting 
timely and important research in the area of changes in economic regulation on ‘winners and 
losers’ in energy markets (Ofgem, 2020). Such efforts could continue and be applied to policy 
changes central to the green transition. 
Another sector that could potentially play a major role in any green recovery is construction 
as revealed by the research work of Gibbs and O’Neill. In one research paper (Gibbs and 
O’Neill, 2014), the authors focus on the green building sector and explore the development 
of green entrepreneurship and the part that it could play in bringing about a shift towards a 
green economy. In a subsequent paper, Gibbs and O’ Neill (2015) examine policy makers’ 
interest in nurturing a green economy, scrutinising the UK government’s efforts in trying to 
bring about changes in the mainstream building and construction sector through encouraging 
the espousal of green building methods and techniques. The paper evaluates the effects of 
recent developments in UK policy concerning green building, as illustrated by Code for 
Sustainable Homes and in Building Regulations. Gibbs and O’ Neill find that these policy codes 
and regulations have produced a particular set of responses to green building requirements 
that tend to favour technological solutions that fit well with the existing system. In summary, 
it is important to recognise, as argued by these two authors, that public and private sector 
organisations that are striving to realise a greener economy are beginning to pay much more 
attention to the role of building and construction, given that this sector of the economy is 
thought to contribute about 45% of carbon emissions (O Neill and Gibbs, 2018).  
2. How do we support people who have lost employment during this crisis to move into 
environmental growth sectors? How can we ensure that such jobs are decently paid, with 
quality training, and offer representation by trade unions? What lessons can be learned 
from past programmes current support and international examples?  
A key step that extends across all such questions is the creation of (re)training schemes hosted 
by firms/industry and/or further education/higher education. Incentives could be considered, 
e.g. tax relief, careers breaks, ‘skills wallets’, to increase the re-employment or re-training of 
sunset industry workers within the renewable sectors.  
To further support this aim, it is important to consider regional task forces that comprise of 
all types of actors – local government, business, trade unions, community advocates and 
charitable organisations. It is imperative that training/retraining schemes and task forces are 
diligently monitored not only through annual reporting but also, if possible, evaluated 
through gold standard randomised control trials.  The regional and devolutionary structure of 
the UK could play a key role in the provision of jobs that can ensure a decent standard of 
living. 
In the short term to medium term, there may be an increase in well-paid jobs by enabling 
people move into the environmental growth sectors with training and support for mid-career 
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retraining. There is also research by Brown and Ahmadi (2018) that suggests a US Green New 
Deal would create ‘35 million job years between 2020 and 2050, with net job increases in 
almost all regions of the US’. Moreover, the onset of electrification may create new jobs and 
sub-sectors of the industry. However, as noted above, care is needed to prevent excessive 
disruption within and between sectors of the labour market and for households reliant on 
legacy infrastructure. Enhancing education will be important to combat the disruption caused 
by artificial intelligence and the digital economy (Blackwell, 2018), and will be key in order to 
match workers to the jobs created throughout the green transformation (e.g. the Labour 
Party’s own ambition of 1 million new jobs). The matching process is important to consider 
when planning, particularly as a product of education, training, income and other labour 
market frictions. 
We have largely laid out the positive case for job creation from the GR in this consultation 
response. The document, however, refers to a long-term time horizon too. Technology 
advancement is deflationary; over time it provides more efficiency for less cost (Booth, 2020). 
If the aim of the GR is to set out a long term path toward i) environmental self-sustainability 
and ii) growth (including well-paid jobs) then there needs to be some consideration paid to 
the unpredictable interaction between these twin goals as shaped by the deflationary effects3 
of rapid technology advancement. This is especially relevant for whether the economics of 
the energy market can continue to deliver well-paid industry jobs and the work-related 
benefits over the longer term if costs keep falling. For instance, faced with a scenario of very 
cheap solar energy and battery improvements for storage, what would Labour’s priority be? 
To protect other [green] industries and jobs, even if they are more inefficient, or to allow 
potentially greater gains in abundance, efficiency and lower energy costs by embracing a 
winner technology (prioritising self-sustainability and quicker carbon neutrality)? The GR 
assumes that we will stimulate enough growth to replace jobs (but Covid-19 may lead to 
unprecedented job losses); what planning is in place if we have to embrace long term 
deflation – i.e. societal models that are not built on a need for a permanent inflationary 
environment (see Booth, 2020)? 
3. How should sector-specific support for business during this crisis be used to both protect 
and promote employment and to pursue our climate and nature objectives?  
As noted in Q1, regional development funds and regional tasks forces could be created, 
starting with the energy, transport and construction sectors. In addition, it will be important 
to target those industries and sectors which are least likely to bounce back from the crisis and 
see where opportunities lie ahead for retraining and redeployment of these skillsets.  For the 
latter, SMEs and the self-employed could be offered incentives, e.g. start-up grants/funds or 
tax relief, to move into the renewable/green sector. More specifically, in the energy sector, 
there could also be sustainable and risk-removing contracts for difference (CfDs) so that firms 
are incentivised to take a ‘risk’ on this industry and do not fear being a first mover. 
We could learn from this experience, as well as be proactive in the effort to create new jobs 
for regions and industries hardest hit by this crisis in order to help counteract the hysteresis 
or scarring effects that arise from unemployment and/or the destruction of business. For 
example, the UK’s industrial policies of the 1980s, that led to the decline of the British coal-
 
3 Deflation of consumer prices and jobs.  
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mining industry, shows the importance of providing timely, sufficient, and effective job 
training, retraining and education, along with support for new industrial sectors that could 
replace those in decline. 
Clearly, there are opportunities to redeploy workers from within fossil fuel industries into 
similar types of engineering roles within the renewable sector. Again, the evidence presented 
in the work of Moulton et el. (forthcoming) illustrates the way in which two cities that have 
both been adversely affected by past industrial change (severe declines in local maritime 
industries e.g. fisheries and shipbuilding) have responded by turning to renewable energy 
(particularly, offshore wind) and the ‘green’ improvement of public housing as a source of 
jobs, economic growth and recovery.  
Nonetheless, we could go further and explore the matching process of skills/education and 
the potential barriers/frictions in order to ensure a smooth transition within and between 
sectors. I.e. what is the scope for redeploying people from industries which are facing a crisis? 
What are the models of retraining and support which should be examined? Do we know of 
examples of programmes which have been effective in enabling redeployment; and what can 
we learn from programmes that have not been effective? Once again, we highlight the 
advantage of taking a regional approach to such analyses and benefitting from the localised 
skills and expertise within given areas of the UK.  
5. Given the regional and area-based impacts of this crisis, what role can a green recovery 
play in mitigating these impacts? What are the lessons of past environmental interventions 
in terms of local and regional impacts?  
A green recovery can play a significant role, both at a regional and a more localised level. As 
discussed immediately above, upskilling and retraining workers to enable them to move from 
old(er) declining sunset industries or sub-sectors/businesses adversely affected by the Covid-
19 crisis to new green jobs (e.g. energy, construction and transport), will be crucial. It will be 
important to take advantage of local geography and sector location in order to harness the 
knowledge and skills of the labour force most effectively. As mentioned above, there are 
several examples of offshore wind firms replacing declining traditional industries in the north 
east of England. Equally, there are moves afoot in the East of England to develop a thriving 
renewables industry (solar and offshore wind). There are also efforts to foster Hydro in the 
North of England, Scotland and Wales, replacing gas platforms and coal mining/steel 
respectively. A regional and area-based green recovery could also harness local support and 
the minimise NIMBY-ism, particularly if the private and public benefits of employment and 
the ancillary opportunities that can be brought to their communities are recognised – 
including the scale of the projects, the money brought in and the source of contractors. 
6. How can we help existing businesses, including SMEs, to adapt as a result of the crisis, 
including through measures for a green recovery? How can these measures be allied to the 
improvement of productivity and viability for these companies?  
Again, it is a matter of investment in infrastructure, physical capital, new technologies, and 
the provision of funding for (re)training of employees in businesses of all sizes, SMEs to MNCs. 
All of which could assist in achieving higher labour productivity and ensuring the future 
resilience of workers and firms. Support could be offered to help and assist time- and finance- 
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constrained SMEs. The message must be one of ease, convenience, and a willingness to 
connect SMEs with other enterprises in order to make it worthwhile to increase productivity. 
Interestingly, an observation by the Governor of the Bank of England that the UK’s poor 
productivity might be given a boost at the expense of jobs, as a result of Covid-19 (Bailey, 
2020). The crisis may be seen as a process of shaking out of less productive firms. However, 
it is important to note that the UK has been stuck in a productivity puzzle since the financial 
crisis of 2008, an issue the UK Government and BoE have struggled to overcome. A genuine 
move towards a green recovery may provide the springboard to reverse the decade long 
plateau in productivity. 
7. How can measures you are proposing in this recovery and renewal period improve quality 
of life—for example around walking, cycling and public transport, and improving access to 
nature? What habitats are you especially concerned about and want to see more support 
for and focus on?  
Quality of life, and life satisfaction more generally, can be improved through the direct 
benefits of employment, job security and continued training/upskilling of workers. The 
economics of life satisfaction/happiness literature clearly highlights the detrimental effects 
of unemployment on measures of life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing (for seminal work 
see e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994)). Indeed, increasing income has a positive effect on life 
satisfaction over the entire income distribution and can bring about greater levels of 
happiness at lower income deciles (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Hence, any green recovery 
measures proposed could/should not only take into account 1) whether a job is 
created/matched, but also 2) whether the job pays a living wage/work-related benefits. 
Similarly, a wealth of research has established a positive association between local 
greenspaces and life satisfaction (see Capaldi et al., 2014 for an overview) and positive (but 
weaker) evidence supporting the positive association with emotional wellbeing (Houlden et 
al., 2018). With this in mind, access to nature and the roll-out of greener transport, e.g. cycling 
and e-mobility, could not only be seen through the lens of direct health benefits but also the 
lens of climate change, environmental and conservation goals. 
Opt-out (rather than opt-in) mechanisms have successfully overcome inertia and changed 
behaviour in complex markets (e.g. organ donations, pension contributions). This concept 
could be applied to the installed on solar PV (as mentioned in Q1) and the consideration of 
mass opt-out tree-planting in public/Government-owned land. This programme learns from 
and could potentially be spearheaded by the Woodland Trust’s Free Trees for Schools and 
Communities programme.  
Tree planting initiatives are crucial for the development and conservation of the environment 
and the wellbeing of staff and students tackling exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, 
Dr Burlinson and Dr Fairbrass are thankful to the Woodland Trust as we have been successful 
in our application for the delivery of 120 saplings to be planted at the University of East 
Anglia’s campus in November 2020. With social distancing rules in place, we aim to randomly 
assign participation to members of staff and students to extend the benefits to those 
more/less likely to participate. Similar programmes based in the UK could provide the 
necessary respite for students/staff/communities involved in similar tree planting schemes in 
the upcoming term/year. 
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This points towards a broader concern about how urban greenspaces are utilised and 
ensuring that any adaptations to these spaces are implemented in a way that includes a wider 
demographic of users (i.e. not focus purely on enthusiasts). 
Regarding transport, the car industry, for instance, is currently built around an economy 
where the car sits in an owner’s drive for 95% of the time (Morris, 2016). It is possible that 
automation and the rise of alternative modes of transportation (in 2019, 111 million people 
used the Uber app on a monthly basis (Statista, 2020)) will alter how we move around and 
reshape how we think about owning vs. renting/sharing electric powered and even 
automated transportation. Renting/sharing models could once again provide an alternative 
mode of access to e-mobility for households residing in privately rented accommodation or 
tower blocks. 
To move further up the S-curve4, the Government may need to play a more interventionist 
role in order to boost household investment in electric vehicles. Intervention is also likely to 
be required to incentivise SME projects aiming to implement innovative charging points and 
services. Supporting charging at home or the provision of alternative charging points/services 
when this is not possible is key – whilst households may feel less anxious about travelling with 
public charging points when travelling, a central source of anxiety arises from the inability to 
charge at home or lack of access to services that can step into this role. 
9. What are the key institutions including business, local government, trade unions who 
should play a role in delivering a green recovery? Are there particular lessons that should 
be learnt about effective delivery? Local people know their communities better than 
Westminster. What steps do we need to introduce to empower local communities to be 
able to tailor the provision to suit their needs?  
All of the governance actors (i.e. business, local government, trade unions, community groups 
and other interest groups) could and should be invited to play a role, however, securing their 
participation in the decision-making/policy-making and also securing their buy-in to the 
objectives of a green recovery may prove more difficult due to constraints surrounding 
time/finances and powerful lobbying forces.  
Local stakeholder involvement is going to be crucial, but the end user’s incentives and ability 
to meaningfully engage may be severely dampened by the effects (e.g. loss of income) in the 
midst and beyond the current crises. On the other hand, despite the current challenges, the 
‘Black Lives Matter’ movement has clearly shown appetite to make a positive change across 
several dimensions of inequality.  
Moreover, an inclusionary, participative, deliberative decision-making process is essential. All 
types of policy actors must somehow be represented – government, business and third sector 
– at all levels of governance from grass-roots up to central government and every other level 
in between. Typically, local people know their communities better than Westminster. The 
importance of grassroots organisations and groups cannot be understated whilst planning to 
establish an inclusionary, participative, deliberative decision-making process. 
 
4 The cumulative distribution function of technology diffusion loosely follows an S-shape. 
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Going forward, open dialogue will be required to design targeted and timely measures which 
can support a green and sustainable recovery, and where blanket policies are offered, 
dissemination of why this is the right step to take must be clarified. Clarity on messaging and 
the role of policies must be clearly disseminated to the public – we have seen the 
consequences that confusion or ambiguous messaging has throughout the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
For effective delivery, the importance of the right regulatory structure to incentivise sharing 
of resources and technologies for better environmental management of common-pool 
resources is crucial. 
A green recovery will benefit greatly from companies working together to share innovative 
technologies, which have positive environmental benefits. It is important to consider how 
regulatory regimes incentivise or disincentivise collaborations and action against 
environmental degradation. A study by Bowen et al. (2018) examined the behaviour of 
Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA) established in 2012 between twelve major 
competing companies in the Alberta oil sands. This research moved beyond studying 
“coordinated” actions (which commonly sees organisations agreeing on rules and acting to 
certify decisions independently) to “collaborative” actions where there is a practice of sharing 
resources and technologies to effectively manage common-pool resources.  Furthermore, this 
often offsets some the reluctance that investors face through the perceived riskiness of these 
types of venture.  
COSIA members developed a set of formal agreements. Specifically, they agreed to: (i) allow 
firms to choose the projects they contributed to, knowing that all project outcomes would be 
shared with all members; and (ii) ensure that any technology that was shared within the 
initiative would not be applied elsewhere (e.g. other countries or regions). Establishing the 
organising rules used to govern shared activities took considerable time to negotiate and 
evolved considerably throughout negotiations. Bowen et al. (2018) found that companies 
took a shorter period to negotiate and generated more innovation projects when the issue 
was relatively small scale and of local relevance. For example, regarding greenhouse gases, 
COSIA failed to make technology/intellectual property shareable beyond the project team, as 
companies did not wish to share technology that was central to their competitive advantage 
outside of the Alberto region. A central lesson is that the bolder the ambition (e.g. getting 
greenhouse emissions down) the more difficult it can be to encourage companies to work 
together effectively because they are concerned about losing a regional competitive 
advantage. CCP has applied learnings from this case study for water companies where 
performance indicators and ranking tables could disincentive to share innovation with 
competitors (Bowen et al., 2019). In 2019 Ofwat launched a consultation of encouraging 







10. What other issues/points do you think are important? What are the Covid-19 challenges 
of delivering such a programme and how might they be overcome?  
The Covid 19 crisis can be seen as a critical juncture (as identified in historical institutionalist 
and path dependency theory) (Hall and Taylor, 1997; North, 1990; Sorensen 2015). It can 
provide an opportunity to break old habits and instil new (greener) ones, rather than continue 
‘business as usual’. 
Public consent remains important for big-scale government investment. Covid-19 has seen 
unrivalled public (and even political) acceptance of unprecedented state intervention to 
protect industries and households from the economic fallout. This may be a turning point 
when the public expects the government of the day to be more proactive in delivering 
ambitious green programmes and strong environmental regulation (Vaughan, 2020).  
Regulation will play an important role in ensuring the right incentive structures are in place 
as UK organisations make a transition to greener practices and put pressure on a range of 
organisations in order to seek to achieve and/or maintain high(er) environmental standards. 
Debates about the ‘level playing field’ provisions (a mechanism preventing either the UK or 
the EU from lowering their environmental standards to secure a competitive advantage) has 
become a sticking point in the UK-EU trade negotiations (Morris. C, 2020). Clearly, there are 
good reasons for trying to secure and sustain high standards via a regulatory framework. For 
instance, there is evidence that when well-targeted regulation is delivered effectively, it can 
have net positive benefits, including for overall productivity. For example, Albrizio et al. (2017) 
assessed a panel of OECD countries who have implemented a wide range of environmental 
policies that aim to improve environmental conditions. With regard to environmental policy, 
the paper demonstrates that higher levels of regulatory stringency (set by regulators in “high 
regulation” countries) benefitted the overall productivity of industries. Productive firms 
benefitted from a short-run increase in productivity growth, whereas least productive firms 
suffered: this suggests that industry overall benefitted from the exit of least productive firms 
in the market. 
It is imperative to view Covid-19 as a crisis which can lead to greener opportunities. We are 
in an unprecedented period where people have been forced to disrupt their routines (e.g. 
working from home, walking/cycling to work, clearing out clutter from rooms/lofts) – we need 
to harness this. For example:  
1) if households are decluttering their homes during lockdown, a programme to rollout loft 
insulation could take advantage of these new clear spaces;  
2) given households are cooking more at home and have moved towards big weekly shops, 
local communities/businesses selling fruit and vegetable boxes/drop-offs could be supported 
by local Government in order to encourage healthy home cooked meals going forward;  
3) fundamentally, children and young adults are living through an unprecedented period of 
isolation and educational/social disruption, it is crucial therefore to reform the education 
system at all levels in order to teach students the link between Covid-19 and conservation, as 
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well as the broader climate change issues, so that they can learn, internalise and shape their 
own green futures; and, 
4) on households adopting walking/cycling routines and travel preferences. The Government 
and transport sector will need to confront whether the apparent decade long move in 
consumer preferences towards large SUVs will continue after this crisis. On the one hand, 
sales in the transport sector have declined over the last decade due to uncertainties in the 
conventional vehicle market. On the other hand, SUV sales have boomed over the same 
period. This leads to a potential trade-off. If EVs are to become competitive their 
manufacturers will have to take a share of the SUV market – thereby reducing road transport 
pollution. But at the same time, relative to smaller EV alternatives, a switch towards larger 
SUVs will exert greater pressure on the power sector at the margin – increasing pollution 
upstream. This trade off needs to be carefully considered if the transport sector is to fruitfully 
contribute to the UK’s net zero targets. 
Finally, we must remain flexible to the possibility of alternative options that may be seen as 
‘viable’ and ‘appealing’, and potentially lead to long-lasting habitual adaptation as we move 
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